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Abstract 
 
 
 
The paper discusses the theoretical framework for cross-national research on corporate 
governance. Although the field of corporate governance is largely explored, the existing 
analyses focus rather on advanced economies and detailed comparisons between them, and 
sometimes try to apply the same theoretical framework to other countries. However, the 
development of a sound governance structure in 'catching-up' economies is typically 
affected by the political process of reforms. Quite often informal institutions, which still 
exist in the political proceedings, undermine formal settings of governance existing in these 
countries. The paper starts with the assumption that considerations of corporate governance 
in the East - West comparisons can not neglect a broad perspective of the political nature 
of governance arrangements both formal and informal. It also examines the adequacy of 
'path-dependency' approaches. It adds to the perspective of Varieties of Capitalism some 
dimensions which make this perspective more sensitive towards East - West analyses. 
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MICHAL FEDEROWICZ 
Introduction 
 
The decade of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe was a period of intensive 
systemic change, ushering in significant and major transformations in fundamental 
institutions in both the political and economic spheres. However, the debates on 
change and restructuring revealed a tendency to an isolationist approach conceptually, 
where (re)building institutions was often viewed as solely specific to countries of one 
region. If broader conceptual comparisons were undertaken, these were primarily in 
the context of the Latin America or Far East Asian experience rather than with 
neighbouring countries in Western or Southern Europe. Irrespective of how 
misleading these distant comparisons may have been, they appeared to have had the 
most visible impact on perceiving and projecting likely trajectories of institutional 
change in the region in the initial stage of post-communist transformation. At the 
same time, the institutional developments in Ireland or Finland, let alone the French 
experience in overcoming the dirigist past or the Swedish policy shift, found almost 
no echo in debate when considering possible lessons learnt in major institutional 
change. Instead, discussion revolved almost entirely around an ideologically biased 
quarrel over gradual and shock therapy, obscuring any genuine perception of the 
concrete problems to be faced.  
 
One reason why more justified cross-country comparisons were not undertaken seems 
likely to be found on the analytical level, where some key notions were unable to 
serve as analytical tools in the new context; such notions had not been related to the 
former communist system, and were difficult to adapt quickly to the post-
communism reality. The notion of corporate governance, and its relation to 
privatisation and other segments of institutional change, would be an example of one 
such concept. Although the question of privatisation in the CEE countries awoke 
wide-ranging and substantial interest, for more than five years at least practically 
nobody linked it to the vital problem of corporate governance1. Yet how was it 
possible that it took so long before the core problem of property relations was given 
an adequate institutional underpinning? The answer to this lies partly in the mystery 
of why well-established scientific notions sometimes prove reluctant to cross borders, 
and if they do, why then they then travel so slowly in the jet age.  
 
 
                                                 
1 One of the first publications was Berglöf, 1995. Then a major work on corporate governance in the 
region was issued in 1996 by R. Frydman, Ch. W. Gray and A. Rapaczynski (eds.): Corporate 
Governance in Central Europe and Russia, CEU Press. This two volume joint work applied the notion 
of corporate governance to various aspects of the extensive and comprehensive plans for privatisation 
in the CEE. Surprisingly, it did not provoke widespread debate on a broader understanding of the 
notion and how it relates to other segments of institutional change. The more detailed analyses 
appeared by the end of the decade, see e.g. K. Pistor et all, 2000, or E. Voszka, 2000. 
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This paper is calling for the re-examination of several notions that serve analyses of 
institutional change. The profound systemic transformations occurring in the CEE 
countries have brought the issue of institutional change sharply into focus, in contrast 
to many factors that have remained in shadow. Despite concentrating on a specific 
group of countries, this research may produce findings surprisingly relevant for a 
more detailed understanding of the quite universal issue of institutional change. This 
paper focuses on the notion of corporate governance, but other related notions may 
equally benefit from substantial debates on both the content and theoretical 
associations. For example, one such notion would be the renowned concept of civil 
society, now re-appearing in conjunction with the new experience in the CEE 
context2. Further concepts in need of debate might relate to those questions of 
democratic deficiencies and democratic governance that have been placed firmly on 
the agenda as the prospect of the EU25 draws ever closer. In general, one might say 
that in the wake of a perspective of Europeanisation, the need to reconsider a range 
of theoretical notions has become more pronounced3.  
 
I believe in the importance of taking an historical orientation in re-considering a 
notion. In order to help fine-tune cross-country comparisons (representing, in other 
words, mutual understanding), such re-consideration ought to uncover significant 
differences in country specific contexts (regions, etc.) which have been historically 
shaped. Research into the specific historical processes in each country (generally, 
each territorial/cultural unit of observation) can be viewed as a methodological 
imperative helping to avoid any simplistic explanations of institutional change, such 
as diffusion or transplantation. In this approach, rather than taking concrete 
institutional solutions as the subjects of cross-country comparisons, we concentrate 
on the socially and politically embedded processes that have led to concrete solutions. 
Historically sensitive analysis, however, does not inevitably imply a path-
dependency perspective. With all due respect to the specific developments taking 
place in each individual country, taken as a whole, the 1990s in Central Eastern 
Europe reveal only yet another instance of a period of intensive institutional 
evolution, frequently observed during the long historical development of capitalism 
though, each time, with different circumstances that were responsible for the 
successes and failures.  
                                                 
2 The issue was recently taken up at the First Edmund Mokrzycki Symposium Building Civil Society 
and Democracy East of the Elbe, a joint venture between WZB, UMK, CEU/CSS and IFiS PAN, 
Warsaw, September 27-28, 2002, and the Workshop Civil Society in the Making, and initiated by 
the Social Science Net Workshop 4, Warsaw, September 20-21, 2002. See especially Leszczenko, 
2002; Reichard, 2002. 
3 This equally affects the issue of corporate governance as primarily related to business structures and 
the business environment, and the broad meaning of governance in the core political context, see e.g. 
G. Grabbe, 2000; 1999; 2001). The issue of democratic deficiency is also related to the problem of 
poor or premature democratic consolidation in the CEE countries (Greskovits, 1998; Mokrzycki, 
Rychard, Zybertowicz, 2002). 
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This paper takes a balanced approach to the dynamics of institutional change to 
account both for past and future dependency, or rather, the past and future 
orientations of the actors involved. The first section attempts to create an adequate 
framework for East-West comparisons, approaching the main thesis on the basis of 
national institutional resources. In the second section, specific issues of the post-
communist environment as related to the corporate governance are indicated, and a 
broader meaning of the notion called for. Before moving on to further elaboration, the 
third section tackles the complexity of the notion within the context of advanced 
economies4. And finally, the fourth section points more precisely to the gap between 
East and West, suggesting the issues that need to be taken into account in considering 
how a sound governance structure emerges. The concluding remarks place the 
meaning of corporate governance in the broader context of European integration and 
a political and economic equilibrium. 
 
 
 
I. The search for an adequate framework for East-West 
comparisons 
 
Over the last twenty years, economic history has witnessed a substantial change in 
nation-wide economic systems and their institutions. From the long term perspective, 
after the oil crises in the early 1970s and years of stagnation in capitalist economies, 
growth in the importance of supply side economics made way for tighter monetary 
policy, privatisation, the shifting role of the state, more independent central banks, 
and careful education and training policies, or special measures for SME 
development. These changes have also provoked major scientific interest in firm 
governance, inter-firm relations, and the institutional environment of business 
activity, with a number of substantial changes running parallel to these interests. 
Institutional change has been evolutionary, occurring within the frame set by 
domestic politics; however, those domestic players were acting in the context of 
strong international interdependence and a growing detailed scientific knowledge 
about the variety of institutional solutions and practices that exist.  
 
At various points in the past, different states in the large family of advanced capitalist 
economies have taken it upon themselves to modify those institutional settings that 
had formerly been regarded as the core of their system of political economy. For 
                                                 
4 This section is based on David Soskices work presented at the Workshop: Corporate Governance in a 
Changing Economic and Political Environment: Trajectories of Institutional Change on the European 
Continent, WZB, 17-18 March, 2000. I am grateful to David Soskice for his contribution to the workshop 
and remain in his debt for the way he structured the problem so clearly, preparing the ground for further 
discussions. Of course, any mistakes that may appear in this section, or its context, remain entirely my own 
responsibility. 
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example, in the 1980s the French attempted regionalisation in a move intentionally 
opposed to the prevailing system of state-centred coordination (Levy, 1994), and 
further examples can easily be found in other countries. In the first half of 1980s, for 
instance, Denmark significantly lowered the institutional level of wage bargaining, 
simultaneously introducing tighter monetary control, and was followed a few years 
later, after some political upheavals, by Sweden (Iversen, 1995). In fact, practically 
all (west) European states were involved in substantial institutional changes. On one 
hand, they were reacting to pressure on markets in the throes of globalisation and the 
signs of tougher competition posing questions to institutions that had emerged and 
functioned well in the periods of prosperity during the 1950s and 1960s; on the other 
hand, new possibilities for old and new EU members were emerging in the wake of a 
deepening European integration taking place within the context of globalisation. 
 
Between 1989-1991, those trends towards both globalisation and European 
integration were given a new impetus from the decline of the Soviet-style economies 
and states. Although the forces driving these two trends lay elsewhere, the end of the 
Cold War between the capitalist world and the socialist world (or communist, or 
party-state-socialist world) suddenly opened a new perspective on political and 
economic evolution in future. 
 
Furthermore, it demanded a new theoretical vision, and resulted in a series of new 
world economy convergence theories running through public debate in the early 
1990s. The convergence idea itself derived from the Anglo-Saxon way of organising 
and controlling business activity, allegedly the method dominating the global 
perspective, and hence stimulating and inducing all national economies to move 
towards this system. There were two aspects particularly that fostered this notion of 
convergence: first, disillusion over state-socialist ideas on economic coordination, 
and second, partial disappointment with Japanese performance and the Japanese 
model, that had been so eagerly studied before. However, the vision of converging 
capitalism and the end of history provoked new, more sensitive research devoted to 
advanced national economies, focusing on specific, historically developed, national 
economic institutions (Berger, 1996). The findings showed country specific 
trajectories of institutional reforms, taking place within the context of globalisation, 
revealing each mature and coherent national system as having certain advantages over 
the other, yet simultaneously suffering some disadvantages; taken together, these then 
provoke different reactions to the current market game from the firms involved 
(Soskice, 1994; Hancke and Casper, 1996; Vitols et al, 1997). Indeed, if we take the 
last two decades in the integrating world into account, we find international debate 
has not been focused on a simplified juxtaposition of convergence and divergence, 
but rather has been giving detailed consideration to the evolution of historically 
shaped national systems in the process of growing interdependence. Such a 
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perspective can be found in the Variety of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). 
 
In the context of post-communist transformation countries, the VoC approach helps 
to overcome a prolonged, but rather artificial controversy; in this case, between those 
advocating radical change towards a targeted system, and others intent on building a 
new institutional system with recombinant (Stark, 1996) elements of the past, and 
viewing them as the assets of gradual change. As Greskovits pointed out (Greskovits, 
2000), this debate was lacking the sensitive analytical tools needed to distinguish 
between instances where reformers had to act quickly and often unilaterally, and 
where they needed to involve extensive social forces, relying on an interactive 
process to gradually shape institutions. In any event, the question of the countrys 
institutional resources remains unresolved, regardless of how radical or gradual the 
pace of transformation is. 
 
I refer to the Variety of Capitalism perspective to move beyond the quarrel between 
simplistic designers of capitalism with their prescription for one way performance, 
and equally simplistic advocates of a path-dependency approach, which tends to 
rely heavily on explanations oriented towards the past. The VoC approach, by 
definition, exposes diversity within the capitalist family, while considering the 
interplay between various models, as well as between those domestic and external 
forces that shape the dynamics of institutional change. Similarly, it allows the context 
of globalisation and European integration to be a present factor in considerations, 
while the typical attempts to preserve and reproduce existing domestic constellations 
are analysed in terms of a variety of possible responses to external challenges. In such 
a view, there is no doubt that the same institution, embedded in one economy and 
society, works differently (or does not work at all) after being transplanted to another 
economy and society; the aim, though, rather than offering suggestions to other 
countries, is to observe incremental changes in one or the other country, and see 
which factors (both domestic and external) and constellations of economic and 
political interests have determined its dynamics. In this way, performance in one 
country may contribute to shaping the strategies of economic and political actors in 
other countries. In other words, the VoC approach allows us to deal with country 
specific and dynamic models, providing a framework where the outcome of East-
West or cross-country comparisons do not imply a direct analogy (always 
questionable), but rather suggests reasons for the different dynamics of change.  
 
If I partially object to the path-dependency approach, this is not to say that it is 
wrong. In historical terms, I can agree essentially that national politics and national 
history has an absolutely fundamental role in framing how capitalist institutions 
become specifically incorporated, and indeed this is actually how the path-dependent 
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national embeddness of capitalist institutions manifests itself5 (Chavance and 
Magnin, 2000). This generally works for advanced economies and, in this aspect, also 
finds endorsement in the VoC approach. The point is, however, that applying the 
same path-dependent perspective to the east may often be misleading, precisely 
because it does not resolve the problem of massive and fundamental institutional 
change. It provides no information on how and to what extent consecutive countries 
have been able to ascertain or, in varying degrees, overcome their past. Instead, it 
generates a bias towards simple post facto explanations. And when we turn to 
advanced countries  for example, France, which was not only able to build but also 
overcome a dirigiste state co-ordination  the path-dependence approach similarly is 
not extremely helpful, since one needs to move beyond it to understand how a series 
of institutional innovations, together with standardised macroeconomic policies, led 
to a shift in the leading role of the state in favour of firm led corporate adjustment, 
eventually culminating in substantially modification to the institutional settings of 
French corporate governance (Hancke, 2000). 
 
In other words, path-dependency needs to be supplemented and moderated by other 
concepts; in this context, I would suggest two additional notions are required. Firstly, 
the hierarchy of institutions, where some institutions, to a large extent, determine 
others; hence, explaining massive change requires examining the more influential 
institutions and looking both at how they balance old and new driving forces, and 
the way they exercise influence on institutional change, where, for instance, the 
interplay between political and economic institutions may turn out to be a key part of 
such an explanation. In the Soviet world, political institutions had an all-pervading 
influence on the economy. The degree of political change, then, in any given country 
influenced the nature and outcome of economic change, with, as Hellman 
demonstrated taking data from a large sample of transforming countries, the more 
democratic the regime, the more robust the economic development (Hellman, 1998)  
although this was not so obvious to many researchers when post-communist 
transformation first began. The nature of political institutions affects the nature of 
dominating business networks that encompass business activity, and this, in turn, 
contributes to the game between reshaping and reproducing economic institutions. 
This aspect was often neglected by network analyses, but the concept of a hierarchy 
of institutions would help to avoid such a gap. 
 
Nonetheless, one might still argue that the core institutions are themselves path-
dependent, even though a part of their evolution certainly is derived from 
contradicting historical dependency. The unresolved issue revolves around how to 
conceptualise what is beyond path-dependency, and, typically, the answer is that 
                                                 
5 I am grateful to Bernard Chavance for clarification of this point during our several discussions; see 
also Chavance and Labrousse, 1998). 
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change comes from outside. However, such an approach results in seeing domestic 
forces as path-dependent and external forces as innovative  a view I cannot 
subscribe to. Change agents can be found both inside and outside the domestic arena; 
more importantly, both of them modify their strategies according to their future 
oriented expectations and calculations. It is precisely the future oriented calculations 
of actors who are participating and contributing to change that is overlooked in 
analyses of institutional development.  
 
Thus, the second aspect, in addition to the hierarchical nature of institutional settings, 
is the strong future orientation of (some) economic and political actors. As existing 
institutional settings become less and less satisfying, these actors gain both in voice 
and audience, provoking other actors to more future oriented speculations about likely 
change. In turn, their redefined expectations create a new environment that may 
reinforce the change. The essential feature in these path-finding cycles (Federowicz, 
2000) is that some actors transcend the existing institutional settings, frequently 
devoting considerable effort to escape from them. In their calculations about the 
future, they try to anticipate the likely change and reap the benefit from being ahead 
in this process. In doing so, they contribute to the shift of core institutions, or to the 
establishment of some new core institutions. Then, in the medium and long-term 
perspective, prior to a new institutional setting becoming firmly established, they 
either receive praise or punished for their path-finding activity, depending on the 
hierarchy of other interfering institutions. In my view, these two concepts  the 
hierarchy of institutions, and the anticipated institutions undertaken by some actors 
before they are really established  may help us to understand massive institutional 
change better. 
 
The thesis of this paper is that each national system copes with new challenges in its 
own way, because it tries to rely as much as possible on its pre-existing institutional 
resources. It is in these terms that (with some exceptions) the domestic elite and 
domestically important actors, including major social actors, think about their 
adaptability to changing circumstances. Similarly, society also organises its major 
economic activity, and mobilises resources for change in this same way. In this sense, 
even given strong converging pressure, what tends to be experienced, rather than 
adaptation of external patterns or a radical shift to a different logic of institutional 
arrangements, is actually an incremental change. The issue of national assets is one 
shared in both the East and the West, with a similar temptation to protect them as 
much as possible at the expense of external adaptability. However, the more stable 
the position of a country, the more successful is an institutional change that 
recombines pre-existing institutional assets with just a few new elements. Similarly, 
the more problematic the economic position of any given country is, the more 
damaging such a natural attempt to preserve pre-existing constellations of domestic 
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forces, and the more promising it may be to abandon them as quickly as possible 
(Minev, Zheliazkova, 2000). In other words, re-combination of existing assets is 
likely to succeed in countries that, though facing a need for change, enjoy a stable 
economy and relatively coherent institutional settings, like France or Germany. On 
the contrary, countries marked by weakness in the economy and disintegrating 
institutional settings (often unacknowledged initially), sooner or later will need to 
challenge massive and fundamental transformation with the requisite openness to the 
external change factors.  
 
Advanced economies are powerful enough to resist outside pressure, modifying their 
institutions in their own way; however, economies in the throes of intense 
transformation have little space for such a strategy. Understanding this contrast in 
detail, I believe, helps to explain the successes and failures in the process of 
transformation. This comparison is also fruitful when taking the contents of the same 
terms in the context of a different country and seeing what variations there are. For 
instance, the state and state regulation, as a notion, may evoke essentially different 
associations, and even actually refer to a different type of political and economic 
relations; a less obvious example would be how the notion of cross-ownership may 
refer to different denominations in, say, Germany and the Ukraine. In exposing all 
these differences, the VoC approach assists in examining institutional gaps and 
inconsistencies, or incomplete processes of change, more precisely. Instead of one-
way directives, it provides an insight into multiple international pressures, without 
losing sight of domestic development and the prevailing interests in the domestic 
arena. 
 
 
 
II. Transformation in a post non-market economy and the 
meaning of corporate governance 
 
The last twenty years unfolded in a totally different way in eastern and western 
Europe. Naturally, there were also variations between countries within both East and 
West, yet, in terms of governance issues, the most striking difference between the two 
groups of countries was that in the East, unlike in advanced capitalist economies, the 
economic stagnation occurring after the late 1970s (no matter what official statistics 
may claim) was initially more delayed, but then provoked substantial institutional 
change. In no country could the proposed changes satisfy the need for major reforms, 
without substantial structural change. The principal result of economic stagnation in 
the East was exhausting the existing material assets, including human resources, 
which finally contributed to the collapse of the system. Until the symbolic collapse of 
the Berlin wall, with very few exceptions, the firms located between the Elbe and 
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Kamchatka were not subject to any typical market pressures, international or 
domestic, but this was precisely the pressure behind the necessary changes in western 
economies, even if governments tried to dampen or delay it. After 1989, the East 
became similarly subject to this same pressure, though at different speeds in different 
countries, branches and sectors. Indeed, this helps further explain the differences 
between them, although, in a sense, eastern enterprises were thrown into the context 
of globalised economy overnight, while western European countries had taken 
gradual steps towards globalisation, powered partly (although not in all cases) by the 
advantage of exceptional prosperity of 1950s and 1960s. At the same time, in the 
East, the fruits of earlier economic developments were largely exhausted in trying to 
cover up the costs involved in the desperate reproduction of one-party political and 
economic control. 
 
This is why direct market pressures, with all their positive and negative aspects, 
became so important in large-scale activation of economic life. Whatever the former 
economic system was, and whether it is termed communist, socialist or a party state 
economy, it was quite simply a non-market system. In other words, the market game 
as such hardly existed and, hence, could not contribute to shaping relations between 
the participants of economic life, or their individual strategies (Kornai, 1980; Beksiak 
et al, 1990; Mlcoch, 1992). Of course, there were some small niches where a quasi-
market periodically emerged in some countries, but all these spheres were totally 
dependent on decisions taken in the non-market core of the system and fundamentally 
lacked the stability necessary for economic development. As mentioned before, very 
few enterprises had any expertise in the international market game. Instead, they 
reflected the whole complexity of ambiguous dependencies found in a centralised and 
poorly functioning decision-making system. Thus, at the micro-level, the most 
striking difference between East and West was that even the best firms in the East 
were practically cut off from that expertise on genuine institutional development, 
which, in the context of growing internationalisation of business activity, was 
gradually evolving in the West. It was in this situation that the momentum of 
globalised confrontation came onto the agenda in a far stronger form than ever. 
Nonetheless, the most efficient strategy for catching up with and joining the capitalist 
family proved to be a strategy of openness running in parallel with coherent 
institutional shifts, at the expense of domestically protected interests. 
 
Shifting towards privatisation in post-communist countries during the early 1990s did 
not simply reflect an intellectual fashion, or occur under pressure from international 
financial institutions. Instead, it was a consequence of the weakest points in previous 
micro-economic performance and its institutional settings. The most significant part 
of institutional transformation in the East has been privatisation; however, although 
the aims formulated at the beginning of the decade of 1990s took account of many 
aspects, the question of corporate governance was never raised.  
 13 
BRIDGING EAST AND WEST 
Now, more than ever, it is obvious that the most important goal of privatisation is a 
healthy corporate governance structure: the most crucial concern is not the nominal 
transfer of titles, nor financial income to treasury, but the factors governing the future 
development of privatised firms. When we turn to the central-eastern economies, we 
find the Hungarian experience offers a model for the most efficient way of achieving 
this goal. In spite of early attempts by domestic groups to protect their interests via 
obscure cross-ownership structures, the key strategy of maximising direct foreign 
investments in privatised firms inevitably provided the most transparent corporate 
governance, as has been systematically documented in the work of Eva Voszka 
(Voszka, 2000). 
 
But even where FDI cannot be accessed, as, for a number of reasons, in the case of 
Hungary, corporate governance still remains the most significant outcome of 
privatisation. This similarly brings the issue of property transfer into a much broader 
context, since it inevitably addresses problems that are typically neglected when title 
transfer is taken in isolation. Essentially, when facing deep institutional change, it is 
not sufficient to rely on any one of those models of relations, well known from 
advanced economies, between (new) owners and management, or management and 
workers, to produce a healthy governance structure. In addition to any formal aspect 
of principal-agent relations, it is crucial to know what kind of choices, opportunities 
and constraints the existing institutional system, together with its informal part, is 
offering to all of these economic actors. The Hungarian success did not rely solely on 
FDI, but built principally on the most complete and coherent institutional settings in 
all other spheres, e.g., bankruptcy law, contract law, banking law, etc. (Gray and 
Hendley, 1995). From the perspective of corporate governances political economy, 
the prime factor, however, is that the need for FDI inflows, and the high levels they 
were at, formed the best incentive for consecutive governments, regardless of their 
political options, to build relatively clear institutions that could and did encourage 
important investments. Rather than in the majority of other countries, where FDI 
inflows divided the elites, in this case they contributed to consolidating the position 
of the political and economic elite; sometimes, in the former instances, there was a 
perverse elite consolidation around the greed for domestic assets, with concomitant 
obstacles for foreign investor access. 
 
The importance of corporate governance lies in the centrality of its position, 
interfacing micro-economic (firm level) decisions to those all important institutional 
arrangements that constitute the system of economy in any given country, not only 
including those concerning financial markets and government financial flows, but 
equally those dealing with labour markets and the workers position in decision-
making, entry and exit regulations, contracts, inter-firm relations, self enforcement, 
and the judiciary. 
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When examining corporate governance in emerging market economies, one needs a 
broad and detailed understanding of (un)available strategies and (non-)existing 
constraints on managers, owners, bureaucrats, politicians, and labour. This requires 
moving beyond the single principal-agent approach, which only makes sense after all 
other institutional determinants of this relation have been clarified  and that is 
typically not the case with transforming economies.  
 
The point is, however, that even in advanced economies the notion of corporate 
governance does not simply rest on the narrow basis of the relation between owners 
(shareholders) and top managers. At least, this is not the only way to understand the 
corporate governance issue, and certainly not the most helpful in any comparative 
analysis. What we need is an analytical tool capable of showing the relations between 
corporate governance in its narrow meaning to broadly understood determinants 
derived from other parts of institutional settings. Such an approach will enables us to 
see how corporate governance really works (or why it does not work), and more 
importantly, identify the institutional circumstances that have led to a particular shape 
of corporate governance developing in any given particular country, while 
simultaneously helping to reveal reasons for the different dynamics of change in 
different countries. What is missing in the after-communism economies is this type 
of harmonisation and coherence between formal corporate governance institutions in 
a narrow sense, and the real game over control and decision-making. 
 
 
 
III. The complexity of a coherent governance structure in 
advanced economies6 
 
To uncover the complexity of governance structure at the corporate level, it is quite 
instructive to make use of the well-known comparison between two durable and 
stable systems, the Anglo-Saxon and the German. Despite a certain degree of pressure 
towards convergence, the two systems retain their contradictory quality, with each of 
them marked by the logic of incremental change, rather than any openness towards 
substantially new solutions (Vitols and Casper,1997; Casper, 1999). The differences 
between them facilitate identifying those basic parameters that play a role in the 
governance functioning at present. In other words, the contradiction between these 
two systems provides a foundation for the initial and central step towards 
constructing an analytical framework for cross-country comparisons that inevitably 
depart from the American type of business environment.  
 
 
                                                 
6 See footnote 4. 
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In corporate governance terms, three general institutional factors can be found in any 
advanced economy: on the one hand, the actual system of corporate governance itself, 
in its narrow sense, i.e., supervisory boards, stable shareholder agreements, and 
management, which is, on the other, interlocked with two other segments of the 
capitalist system. 
 
For example, tuning to Germany first, we find a set of product markets radically 
different from those engaged in by either the United States or the United Kingdom. 
This leads us to our first point: the system of corporate governance interlocks with the 
product markets engaged in, the innovation strategies implemented, and the general 
economic activities undertaken in different countries.  
 
Secondly, the system of corporate governance interlocks very closely with other key 
elements of advanced capitalist systems; in particular, the regulations governing the 
labour market, the system of education and training (especially of vocational training 
at work) and the nature of the linkages between companies (networks), embodied in 
institutions like technology transfer and standard-setting. 
 
In other words, it is crucial to understand that there is little point in examining a 
system of corporate governance in isolation. Instead, a more fruitful approach is to 
analyse how it interlocks with 1) the type of economic activity and type of markets 
which companies in that country are engaged in, and with 2) other, key elements or 
capitalist systems: labour markets, education and training, and inter-company 
relations. 
 
As to the corporate governance system itself, there is no doubt that the narrow 
interpretation is presently beginning to change  a process becoming even more 
evident if we briefly review developments. In the last twenty years, economists have 
evolved the corporate governance issue in ways that view it centrally as a problem 
between owners of companies, or between those people providing financial resources 
to companies and, on the other hand, the top managers of those companies. In such a 
model, the corporate governance issue has become referred to as the critical principal 
agency problem. In this scenario, owners have certain goals they would like the 
executive management to carry out, and corporate governance is essential, from the 
owner side, to facilitate this control over what the top managers decide. This give us, 
more or less, the classic approach adopted by economists, or the way they have 
approached it in the recent past.  
 
This language used here talks of aligning executive managers incentives with 
owners incentives. But there is a second principal agent problem: how do top 
managers, or management, get employees - researchers, scientists, engineers, 
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technicians, field workers, clerical workers and so on - to carry through the strategies 
they want to see implemented. In other words, we are dealing with two separate but 
closely inter-linked principal agency games. In the first, owners attempt to control top 
managers and get them to do what they want, and, in the second, top managers, in 
turn, try to get employees to do what they want.  
 
Three elements of critical importance in the system of corporate governance are 
central to solving these games, relating both to the owner-top manager question and 
to the top manager-employee question. First and foremost is the question of 
monitoring: how do owners measure how a company is performing  in this instance, 
how top management is performing, and secondly, how does management measure 
what employees are doing. Hence, the first critical question of corporate governance 
is the monitoring issue: how can an external owner monitor what is going on 
internally in the company, and how does management monitor what employees are 
doing? There issue of corporate governance would evaporate if owners had could see 
exactly what everybody was doing. 
 
The second central issue concerns incentive structures. What incentives do owners 
provide managers to ensure that the owners interests are implemented as far as 
possible, and what incentives do managers, in their turn, give employees, to ensure 
employees behave in appropriate ways as far as the managers are concerned?  
 
The third element is the nature of decision-making: do decision-making procedures in 
any given company primarily allow managers to have unilateral control over 
decision-making, or have they primarily evolved around the model of 
Mitbestimmung, or co-determination, where managers and employees co-determine 
decisions, working within the basic framework of a consensus-oriented decision-
making system? But decision-making does not solely cover the managers and 
employees axis, and can be extended to the relations between owners and managers. 
Is there consensus decision-making system between owners and managers that may 
be loosely classified as a kind of co-determination, as found in the German system, or 
is there a procedure characterising the Anglo-American system, where owners, 
dispersed shareholders, are actually under no particular obligation to the managers of 
the company as such. In other words, under this latter system, somebody might buy a 
large share package, take over the company and then impose completely different 
decisions. 
 
Thus, these three elements  monitoring, incentives, and the nature of decision-
making  can be seen as characterising both of the two interlocked principal agency 
games, between owners and managers, and between managers and employees.  
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In fact, when looking at practical cases, much depends on two aspects of what is 
required from employees, and these two aspects are derived from the type of product 
markets actors are involved in. The first aspect relates to the type of competencies 
and skills employees need to offer, and the second concerns the amount of autonomy 
required from employees to carry through the strategies in the particular product 
markets their company is actively engaged in. We could formulate this as the 
question: How far is it possible to actually monitor or measure exactly what 
employees are doing? After all, if they need a substantial amount of autonomy, it is 
not easy to measure what they do.  
 
These two contradicting systems are obviously not the only systems of governance. 
Even within the Anglo-Saxon system, there are different systems related to small 
companies, like, for instance, the venture capital system that, to a certain extent, 
modifies the strategies of large firms as well. Moreover, the two systems both try to 
absorb some elements from the others that might be helpful in their constant task of 
adjusting to the changing global environment. Nevertheless, these two models, taken 
together with the Japanese one (briefly referred to in the following section) still 
dominate as major points of reference in cross-country comparative research. 
 
 
 
IV. Establishing governance structure during profound systemic 
change 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the notion of corporate governance can already 
draw on a historical evolution. It started as a typically American principal agency 
problem, tacitly assuming country specific institutional arrangements, without any 
need to explicitly refer to the typical American institutional environment, i.e., liquid 
capital markets, high level capitalisation, dispersed banking system, highly 
competitive environment in inter-firm relations, or flexible labour market, (not to 
mention the state not involved in micro-economic decisions), since all of these could 
be taken for granted in examining managerial strategies in the manager-owner game, 
and the impact this would have on the firms performance. However, in a sense, the 
body of literature emerging in the late 1970s and early 1980s referring to the principal 
agency problem, came to pose the broader question of how the earlier autonomy of 
managers that generated such flourishing companies and outstanding results over the 
preceding decades had then contributed to the eventual deterioration in many large 
American concerns. But this was a question almost impossible to answer from within 
the narrow paradigm of a corporate governance principally focused on managerial 
incentives.  
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At that time, European economies were still not integrated or expansive enough to 
provoke any serious analyses of a likely corporate model distinctive from the 
American one, and offering a competitive version. However, a new area in scientific 
investigations into institutional arrangements opened up as the Japanese economy 
expanded in the 1970s and 1980s, and they became increasingly successful at 
confronting American firms in their own markets. Naturally, the emerging literature 
devoted to the Japanese economy could not all be classified as referring to the 
corporate governance issue, especially since the term was not used initially. The main 
stream of research has undertaken attempts to reconstruct the structure of the 
Japanese economic relations within and outside a single firm, which is essentially a 
broader meaning of corporate governance, and eventually led to a detailed description 
of those institutional underpinnings behind Japanese firms strategies and managerial 
decision-making. Not surprisingly, the Japanese system turned out to be much closer 
to the German system than to the American one, (and, in certain aspects even more 
remote from the American model), but it also had its own distinctive features. One 
prime difference, for example, can be found in the role of the banks: Japanese banks 
play a much larger part, and have the technological capacity to monitor the 
effectiveness of corporations. The relation between owners and managers is based on 
regular formal and informal monitoring on one hand, and long-run financial 
provisions on the other. But in contrast to large German firms, Japanese firms tend to 
compete between themselves in their home markets  more of an American style 
relation. Nevertheless, as with German firms, they try to co-operate on some strategic 
goals, like R&D. 
 
The impact of the mass of research on the Japanese economy weakened the dominant 
American position on the intellectual market for institutions and made room for 
Europe oriented investigations. The process of ongoing European integration, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, powered the notion of a European corporate governance 
and helped formulate the concept of continental or Rheinisch corporate 
governance, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-American) model. However, 
the idea underlying the Rheinish model drew heavily on the German matrix (with a 
few Japanese model elements that seemed most relevant at that time), and only 
referred to other European countries rather loosely, in the end expressing less the 
reality of continental Europe, and far more the mere desire for a unified Europe. In 
fact, each country continued institutional adjustment in its own way, trying to 
combine its typical institutional resources with some new solutions, showing 
themselves more open to the pressures of globalisation than any idea of pan-European 
institutional settings. There are simply too many spheres of institutional systems 
involved in real corporate governance to be able to expect any easy harmonisation. 
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France, although relying on the leading role of the national elite, was able to develop 
a significantly growing role for its financial markets, while keeping shareholder 
agreements and long-running financial systems stable. The French system, with its 
strong management both within and outside the company, is quite different from both 
the German and the Anglo-American systems, and more importantly, has little in 
common with the French dirigiste past. 
 
Similarly, countries like Italy and Spain were also experiencing significant changes. 
Although one might expect that these two countries would have similar systems, by 
virtue of sharing a southern European - Mediterranean culture, they are in fact 
significantly different (Aguilera, 2000). Italy, engaging in intensive industrialisation 
after World War II, and involving the state and the political sphere in economic 
development, was determined to keep the banking sector out of industry because of 
the negative experiences in this field in the past. However, recently it has 
significantly reduced state engagement, and is looking rather for cross-country 
alliances with some major firms. Spain, in its post-dictatorship acceleration, relied on 
a relatively strong and state-protected banking system as an asset from the past, but 
has proved to be more open to FDI, a factor making a substantial contribution to 
economic development as well as to the institutional shift. 
 
These cases contrast the reality of a given economy and the perspective of stylised 
models, showing how institutional settings are in permanent change in advanced 
economies. Germany, with the most self-reproducing institutional system, has been 
witnessing a growing number of exceptions in governance arrangements, especially 
in new industries, where firms are trying to escape from, or modify, traditional 
arrangements and practices. This again is a sign that real governance structures tend 
to follow specific product market determinants rather than traditional institutional 
settings.  
 
Corporate governances political economy uncovers the analytical structure in which 
the governance game takes place. Corporate governance, or governance structure, is 
considered here as a coherent part of the institutional system underpinning economic 
life. It is that part of the system that sets the rules of the game for managers and other 
important actors, and which affects strategic decision-making. In a stable economic 
system, these are rather complex but coherent arrangements. As was shown in the 
previous section, the incentive structure explicitly addressed to top managers, or their 
formal relations to the shareholders, only comprise a part of the story. Thus, 
transporting a sole corporate governance element, or even a few elements, from one 
country to another does not then mean that corporate governance will work there. 
Placing corporate governance within the much broader framework of the political 
economy leads to an awareness of the institutional gaps and inconsistencies within 
the system, and leads to a search for the economic and political forces behind them. 
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Nevertheless, the broad meaning of corporate governance cannot be expanded 
without setting limitations on research. To put it explicitly, the centre of investigation 
is the firm, and the rules of the game focusing on top management and the top 
managerial decision-making that eventually shape business strategies. The political 
economy of corporate governance reconstructs the structures inside the firm. But to 
do so, it builds on a extensive knowledge of the institutional environment of the firm, 
exploring a broad economic, political, and social context. It challenges the interplay 
between new and old constraints and opportunities in the game. Since these are 
different in each country and subject to different dynamics of institutional change, a 
broad understanding of corporate governance helps set a comparative perspective. 
Instead of the core concern relating solely to reconstructing a model or models, it 
concentrates on seeing the way in which coherent corporate governance is likely to be 
reshaped, responding to the changing circumstances, (typically the case for well 
established and stable economies), or how it is set and consolidated in emerging 
capitalist economies. The firm here is not considered as an object of typical 
organisational studies, but as one of the key segments of the political economy 
system of contemporary capitalism, which itself can be seen as its nexus7. The key 
factor is that corporate governance institutions bridge the micro and macro level of 
investigation. 
 
At the core of the corporate governance problem lies capitalist development. The 
corporate governance problem initially derived from the split in the roles of the owner 
and of management, sometime in the early decades of the last century, that generated 
capitalist drive and energy in the twentieth century. On one hand, it made capital 
more flexible and open to new possibilities of technological and organisational 
innovations; on the other, it made positive selection for managerial positions possible 
(in place of heritage, tribal, or mafia rule). Finally, it created a market for corporate 
control, if not through the stock market, then at least through mergers and strategic 
alliances.  
 
As far as corporate governance is concerned, the twin poles of capitalist development 
are firstly, the Anglo-American version, (closer to a free market idea but not equal to 
it), where the owner became dispersed during institutional evolution but management 
was very concrete and concentrated and subject to a highly competitive environment, 
and, secondly, the German or Japanese versions of capitalist development, (less 
oriented to a free market idea yet also subjected to a market type competition), where 
the owner became quite concrete and institutionally interlocked within cross-
ownership, while management became less concentrated and had more obligations 
towards both finance providers and employees. 
                                                 
7 One of best synthesis of this perspective has been presented by Peter Hall (Hall, 1995). His work on 
Western Europe may be successfully extended into Central Eastern Europe. 
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Let us now briefly contrast both trajectories of institutional capitalist development 
with the experience of socialist economies in the east of Europe. For this purpose, it is 
sufficient to note that in the latter the role of the owner was absorbed into a non-
definable idea of social (all society) ownership, while the role of management 
became dispersed in a multi-level, hierarchical, and politically controlled 
bureaucracy. The evolution of governance after the Second World War under the 
Communist Party regime is marked by a disappearing sense of ownership coupled 
with growing complexity in decision-making structures (both formal and informal) 
and that dramatic growth in the significance of informal relations which eventually 
led to the ungovernability of the system. In contrast, in the same period, and 
specifically since 1970s, all kinds of institutional arrangements related to governance 
and decision-making, such as capital flows and instruments, managerial incentives, 
and the banking system and labour market, underwent intensive fine-tuning in the 
capitalist countries. 
 
Undoubtedly, the initial idea of major privatisation in the East together with a 
political turn around was definitely the right approach. However, this did not deal 
with all institutional areas related to the governance, and did not even pose the 
question of likely governance structures after privatisation in a continuing 
institutional environment, an oversight that inevitably resulted in a partial course of 
reforms without any systematic coordination. But there was a further inconsistency 
between the premises and their practical application. While the reformers, both from 
within and outside the countries involved, typically opted for American style 
development to create institutionally ensured competitive environments as quickly as 
possible, part of the former nomenclatura, although not objecting to American style 
business relations, took steps to ensure cross-ownership as a means of institutionally 
safeguarding long term corporate control. As a result, the trajectories of institutional 
change were not coherent. On one hand, primarily due to financial sector weakness, 
the cross-ownership relations could not evolve as in say, Germany or France; on the 
other hand, financial markets, with both low capitalisation and poor transparency, did 
not reassemble those in the US or the UK either (Coffee, 1996). The state, still 
heavily involved through nominal ownership of large portions of the economy and 
vast financial flows, did not reflect a Western understanding of state involvement. 
The more consistent policies were only able to be consolidated after serious macro-
economic problems, like those in Hungary in 1995, or those experienced later and 
more seriously in the Czech Republic, in 1997; the price for the inconsistencies was 
always high  sometimes extremely high  as in the banking crash in Bulgaria, in 
1997. 
 
In terms of Section 3 of this paper then, let us then summarise what needs to be taken 
into account in a broad understanding of corporate governance.  
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First of all, the system of corporate governance interlocks with the type of product 
markets, and vice versa. The success in particular product markets depends on initial 
corporate governance settings and their further development, as can clearly be seen 
when comparing the good performance of Japanese firms in the 1980s, before the 
impact of telecommunication and other information technologies, and their steadily 
more difficult conduct in the following decades. This is also a challenge for western 
European economies, which may need further changes in their corporate governance 
settings. Indeed, in countries like Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, or France for that 
matter, it remains uncertain whether things will continue in the same pattern as has 
been pursued over the last twenty years, whereby recent years have suggested 
significantly greater uncertainty over whether they can do so. These European 
countries have become more flexible and competitive than they were before, but have 
nonetheless retained an underlying form of capitalism that is distinctly different from 
the Anglo-Saxon system. It is not clear whether this sort of internally changing but 
divergent paths model will continue to develop, or whether there will be a 
convergence towards a more Anglo-Saxon system. Leading technological 
development of the last five to ten years lean towards the Anglo-Saxon experience, 
but it is too early to say what the final outcome will be. Rather than debating 
convergence versus divergence, understanding the growing interdependence between 
firms, economies, and institutional systems requires looking at specific product 
markets that tend to dominate economic development and seeing what type of 
governance best promotes such development.  
 
There is much more uncertainty, however, concerning the developing economies, 
including those of Central-Eastern Europe. The lesson of the product markets 
suggests the question of corporate governance is not as abstract as some theories of 
capitalism would like to believe. Issues in transforming economies remain unresolved 
as regards the kind of market niches they are likely to explore, and how their efforts 
to consolidate the governance structures coincide with these potential markets. For 
example, one factor in the recent Irish success was how the Irish potential, in terms of 
institutional resources, to follow the Anglo-American governance structure went hand 
in hand with the rapid development of lucrative industries. However, such a happy 
coincidence remains the exception rather than the rule. 
 
Secondly, as was pointed out above, the system of corporate governance interlocks 
very closely with the other key elements in capitalist systems, such as the labour 
markets, education and training, or inter-company relations. But, in this instance, the 
list of the other elements is very much country sensitive and needs to refer to country 
specific circumstances. For instance, as the French case shows, the arrangements of 
elite circulation may turn out to be crucial in reshaping corporate governance; in 
contrast, in the UK, the type of contracting arrangements is important. For countries 
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in post-communist transformation, the emerging governance structure interlocks with 
the state, where the latter is defined as a set of (exhausted) institutions  for example, 
the construction of the Ukrainian state after 1991 hampered both the reform of 
corporate governance and economic institutional reforms8. In all countries, the nature 
of business networks, with their political involvement, affects inter-company 
relations. In general, in Central Eastern Europe, corporate governance interlocks with 
all kinds of arrangements contributing to the rapid process of capital formation by 
exchanging pre-existing non-financial for financial capital.  
 
Essentially, as far as corporate finance is concerned, the problem of corporate 
governance is not only the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997: 737), 
but it also comprises a reverse perspective. It also concerns the ways top managers try 
to secure finance for their companies  and they do this in all the ways provided by 
the formal and informal institutional environment, with all the business and political 
commitments necessary. This is why, regardless of formal ownership ties, the 
financial sector and the state (with the flows of public money) are important parts of 
the system which interlocks with corporate governance. 
 
Thirdly, this last point clearly indicates one more part needing to be considered when 
dealing with institutional change in the field of corporate governance: the framework 
of macro-economic policy. This is visible in the French experience, for example, but 
it is equally clear in other countries as well. The nature and consistency of macro-
economic policy affects all financial flows, and thus may significantly change the 
environment for reshaping governance structures and managerial decisions. The 
context of macro-economic policy helps to understand the pace and quality of 
institutional change in both West and East. 
 
The narrow meaning of corporate governance, of course, does retain its importance, 
together with those numerous regulations that largely determine business relations. 
The broad understanding of corporate governance, however, is essential if we are to 
make sense of these detailed regulations, to see the real alternatives behind 
managerial choices, and to investigate the institutional and macro-economic context 
of micro-economic strategies. In more general terms, it is necessary to address the 
question of the equilibrium / inequilibrium of institutional systems, which, in turn, 
indicates how we need to address the dynamics of the change of governance 
structures. For advanced economies primarily engaged in high-tech competition, (in 
the long run, determining their economic position), the general equilibrium is 
permanently disturbed by the new product markets putting pressure on both macro-
                                                 
8 See, for example. DAnieri, P., Kravchuk, r., Kuzio T., 1999; Kuzio, T., Kravchuk, t., DAnieri, P., 
(eds.), 1999; Sidenko and Kuziakiv, 2000. 
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economic policies and existing institutional settings. For transforming economies, the 
broad understanding of corporate governance uncovers how difficult it is to attain an 
institutional equilibrium, even where some of the detailed regulations for corporate 
governance may be very well designed (Pistor, 2000). In other words, the broad 
understanding of corporate governance uncovers institutional gaps and 
inconsistencies.  
 
 
 
 
V.  Concluding remarks 
 
Looking at the institutional dynamics of emerging systems, one can refer to a broader 
thesis of low level equilibrium, as formulated by Greskovits, for countries 
transforming after the period of communist dominance (Greskovits, 1998). This 
model addresses the relationship between the political system and the economic 
system in these countries, and reflects the initial worries about their capacity to 
consolidate democracy coupled with, simultaneously, a challenge to any significant 
economic reform, which allegedly inevitably results in massive social protests. Yet 
the protests did not occur to an extent that would have threatened the continuity of the 
reforms. According to the low equilibrium thesis, this is because these countries did 
manage to build formal democratic institutions and the rudiments of market relations, 
although they are rather poor democracies and deeply imperfect markets. 
Consequently, the kind of equilibrium between those deficiencies makes the low level 
(low quality) of the system rather stable and durable.  
 
The field of corporate governance suggests that the last statement about the durability 
of low equilibrium would only be justified if the economic system were closed. The 
analysis points out the numerous partial disequilibria in the issue of corporate 
governance, approached in broad terms. Of course, these disequilibria may be (and 
often were) balanced by an imperfect democracy where the formally democratic 
mechanisms of political control do not really function. Yet, growing economic 
pressures, coming from both international product markets and financial markets, 
make such a kind of balance increasingly difficult. In addition, domestic social 
protests in this context may encourage a further institutional change towards a more 
mature democratic system, precisely because they help destroy the equilibrium which 
is itself proving to hamper development. In any case, we can say the more open the 
economic system, the more pressure there is on a low level balance of domestic 
institutions. 
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The broad perspective on corporate governance can also make another contribution 
here. The product markets know their specific hierarchy in the value chains, some of 
them being more profitable than others, and indeed, this is all part of the game 
between advanced economies in high-tech competition. This itself is one reason for 
permanent modifications to corporate governance, and a measure of its efficiency. 
However, in the case of deeply transforming economies, this is even more complex: 
they actually do not freely pick up the desired elements of existing models and 
practices. Instead, they face many constraints, lacking the capital and ability to enter 
international markets, and being forced not only to reconstruct their production 
regimes but also to establish themselves, in terms of recognition and location, in the 
international division of labour. This is, both in advanced and developing economies, 
the primarily activity of concrete firms, and the games outcome is clearly visible on 
the firm level. Nevertheless, as the VoC approach demonstrates, the national 
arrangements, as well as the trajectories of their change, do matter because they 
largely determine the firms adaptability to global pressures. 
 
Similarly, the supra national level influences the national and firm levels, and does it 
more to those countries and firms that, on one hand, are badly in need of capital and, 
on the other hand, suffer from the inconsistency of institutional arrangements; in 
other words, this is undoubtedly where we can find the core-periphery type of 
relations. Early dependency literature taught that economic development in peripheral 
countries takes place to a certain extent providing the core states accept development 
as needed. Although the accession of Central and Eastern European countries cannot 
be considered totally on a par with this experience, it is not entirely clear how much 
equalisation and dependency lie behind European harmonisation. As Grabbe states, 
on the one hand, the Copenhagen Conditions make much of the necessary capacity 
[of the candidate countries] to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union, yet, on the other hand, the EU has so far focused on rote adoption 
of legislation, with little attention to the impact that the resulting micro-institutional 
structures have on efficiency. There is clearly no one European model of corporate 
governance and, as Grabbe argues, the EU seems to have more influence on market 
regulations in central Europe than it has in western Europe: Europeanisation may 
conflict with globalisation where the EU is imposing rigid and potentially 
inappropriate policy frameworks (Grabbe, 2000). Although the perspective of 
accession generally encourages political and economic reforms, the process of 
accession itself, in terms of European harmonisation, is not necessarily equivalent to 
an economic transformation that would improve the firms competitiveness. 
Nonetheless, the role of domestic politics and the consistency of domestic 
institutional reforms are clearly significant here since they do much to improve the 
bargaining position of the candidates. 
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When the Soviet Union dissolved, the economies of the region found themselves 
typically between two poles, the US and western Europe. Under such circumstances, 
the emergence of new institutional settings owed much not only to the legacy of the 
past, but also to a vision of the two contradictory corporate traditions, and the actual 
exercise of relations with each of the poles, FDI inflows from various directions, and, 
last but not least, each countrys own capacity for converting domestic policies into 
flexible ones. More recently, EU enlargement tends to take over this process for 
candidate countries, but neither the outcome for individual (pre and post) accession 
games is entirely determined, nor, for all European countries, from Portugal to 
Ukraine and Russia, is the outcome of the larger game over globalisation. 
 
There is not really a market for institutions; market forces do not directly decide 
what the corporate governance settings in a particular country are  and if they 
sometimes do, this is not inevitably the best solution. The best (in a certain period, 
for certain product markets) arrangements do not necessarily go to places with the 
highest demand for them. The best models change and, at the institutional level, 
there is no strong selection mechanism. For this reason, the historically shaped 
domestic political scene plays a crucial role in a countys adaptability, and, with it, 
makes a contribution to establishing permanent, capitalist, institutional change. 
Nevertheless, the long-term the economic strength of a country has a marked effect 
on this process, and derives just as much from its international market position, as 
from its political (and to certain extent cultural) position in international power 
structures.  
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